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IMPROVED CRYPTANALYSIS OF RANK METRIC SCHEMES BASED ON GABIDULIN
CODES
AYOUB OTMANI, HERVE´ TALE´ KALACHI, AND SE´LESTIN NDJEYA
ABSTRACT. We prove that any variant of the GPT cryptosystem which uses a right column scram-
bler over the extension field as advocated by the works of Gabidulin et al. with the goal to resist to
Overbeck’s structural attack are actually still vulnerable to that attack. We show that by applying the
Frobenius operator appropriately on the public key, it is possible to build a Gabidulin code having the
same dimension as the original secret Gabidulin code but with a lower length. In particular, the code ob-
tained by this way correct less errors than the secret one but its error correction capabilities are beyond
the number of errors added by a sender, and consequently an attacker is able to decrypt any ciphertext
with this degraded Gabidulin code. We also considered the case where an isometric transformation is
applied in conjunction with a right column scrambler which has its entries in the extension field. We
proved that this protection is useless both in terms of performance and security. Consequently, our re-
sults show that all the existing techniques aiming to hide the inherent algebraic structure of Gabidulin
codes have failed.
1. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the post-quantum cryptography was mainly enabled thanks to Shor who proved
[Sho94, Sho97] that the discrete log problem and the factorization can be solved in polynomial time
with an hypothetical quantum computer. Recent progress in solving the discrete log problem, and
the fact that important industrial investments are made to build a quantum computer have aroused
concerns about the foundations of the real-world cryptography, prompting people to seek serious
post-quantum alternatives.
Among all the existing solutions, McEliece scheme [McE78] is one of the oldest post-quantum
public key encryption scheme. The innovative McEliece’s approach rests on the use of the theory of
error-correcting codes to design a one-way function of the form m 7→ mG + e where G generates
a vector subspace of Fn2 and e is a random binary error vector of Hamming weight tpub. McEliece
used binary Goppa codes which are well-known for having a very fast decoding algorithm. Designed
in 1978, it has withstood several attack attempt but it suffers from an important drawback due to the
enormous size of the public keys. In order to solve this problem, several modifications of the scheme
have been proposed among which the use of rank metric codes instead of the Hamming metric. The
first rank-metric scheme was proposed in [GPT91] by Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov which is
now called the GPT cryptosystem. This scheme can be seen as an analogue of the McEliece scheme
public key cryptosystem based on the class of Gabidulin codes. An important operation in the key
generation of the GPT cryptosystem is the “hiding” phase where the secret generator matrixG under-
goes a transformation to mask the inherent algebraic structure of the associated Gabidulin code. This
transformation is a probabilistic algorithm that adds some randomness to its input. Originally, the
authors in [GPT91] proposed to use a distortion transformation that takes G and outputs the public
matrix Gpub = S(G + X) where X is a random matrix with a prescribed rank tX and S is an
invertible matrix. The presence of a distortion matrix has however an impact: the sender has to add an
error vector whose rank weight is tpub = t− tX where t is the error correction capability of the secret
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underlying Gabidulin code. Hence, roughly speaking, the hiding phase publishes a degraded code in
terms of error correction.
Gabidulin codes are often seen as equivalent of Reed-Solomon codes in the Hamming metric and
like them, they are highly structured. That is the reason why their use in the GPT cryptosystem has
been the subject to several attacks. Gibson was the first to prove the weakness of the system through
a series of successful attacks [Gib95, Gib96]. Following this failures, the first works which modified
the GPT scheme to avoid Gibson’s attack were published in [GO01, GOHA03]. The idea is to hide
further the structure of Gabidulin code by considering isometries for the rank metric. Consequently,
a right column scrambler P is introduced which is an invertible matrix with its entries in the base
field Fq while the ambient space of the Gabidlun code is F
n
qm . But Overbeck designed in [Ove05b,
Ove05a, Ove08] a more general attack that dismantled all the existing modified GPT cryptosystems.
His approach consists in applying an operator Λi which applies i times the Frobenius operation on the
public generator matrix Gpub. Overbeck observed that the dimension increases by 1 each time the
Frobenius is applied. He then proved that by taking i = n− k − 1 the codimension becomes 1 if k is
the rank ofGpub (which also the dimension of the associated Gabidulin code). This phenomenon is a
clearly distinguishing property of a Gabidulin code which cannot be encountered for instance with a
random linear code where the dimension would increase by k for each use of the Frobenius operator.
Overbeck’s attack uses crucially two important facts, namely the column scrambler matrix P is
defined on the based field Fq and the codimension of Λn−k−1 (Gpub) is equal to 1. Several works
then proposed to resist to this attack either by taking special distortion matrix so that the second
property is not true as in [Loi10, RGH10], or by taking a column scrambler matrix defined over the
extension field Fqm as in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11].
In this paper, we study the security of the second approach. We show that even if the column
scrambler is defined on the extension field as it is done in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11], it is still possible
to recover a secret Gabidulin code using precisely Overbeck’s technique. Our analysis shows that by
applying the operator Λi with i < n − k − 1, we obtain a Gabidulin code whose error correction t
∗
is indeed strictly less than the error correction of the secret original Gabidulin code but, t∗ is strictly
greater than the number of added errors tpub. In other words, an attacker is still able to decrypt
any ciphertext and consequently, all the scheme presented in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11] are actually
not resistant to Overbeck’s attack unlike what it was claimed by the authors. When the attack is
implemented with the recommended parameters of [GRH09, RGH11], our experimental results show
that the attack is very fast (less than one second). In particular, our results outperform those given in
[GRS16, HTMR16] which were for a while the best attacks against the schemes of [Gab08, GRH09,
RGH11]. Note that the attacks of [GRS16, HTMR16] are generic decoding algorithms whereas our
approach is directed towards recovering the structure of a Gabidulin code.
2. PRELIMINARY NOTION
The finite field with q elements is denoted by Fq where q is a power of a prime number. For any
subfield K ⊆ F of a field F and for any positive integers k and n such that k 6 n, the K-vector space
spanned by b1, . . . , bk where each bi ∈ F
n is denoted by
∑k
i=1 K bi. The set of matrices withm rows
and n columns and entries in F is denoted byMm,n (F). The group of invertible matrices of size n
over F is denoted by GLn(F).
Definition 1 (Rank weight). LetA be a matrix fromMm,n (F) where m and n are positive integers.
The rank weight of A denoted by |A| is the rank of A. The rank distance between two matrices A
and B fromMm,n (F) is defined as |A−B|.
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It is a well-known fact that the rank distance on Mm,n (F) has the properties of a metric. But in
the context of the rank-metric cryptography, this rank distance is rather defined for vectors x ∈ Fnqm .
The idea is to consider the field Fqm as an Fq-vector space and hence any vector x ∈ F
n
qm as a matrix
from Mm,n (Fq) by decomposing each entry xi ∈ Fqm into an m-tuple of F
m
q with respect to an
arbitrary basis of Fqm . The rank weight of x also denoted by |x| is then its rank
1 viewed as a matrix
of Mm,n (Fq). Hence, it is possible to define a new metric on F
n
qm that we recall explicitly in the
following.
Definition 2. Let us consider the finite field extension Fqm/Fq of degree m > 1. The rank weight of
a vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) in F
n
qm denoted by |x| is the dimension of the Fq-vector space generated
by {x1, . . . , xn}
|x| = dim
n∑
i=1
Fqxi. (1)
Similarly, the column rank over Fq for any matrix M fromMk,n (Fqm) is also denoted by |M |.
Remark 1. Note again that |M | represents dim
∑n
i FqM i where M 1, . . . ,Mn are the columns of
M , that is to say the maximum number of columns that are linearly independent over Fq when each
entry is written as an m-tuple of Fmq with respect to a basis of Fqm . Equivalently, |M | is also the
maximal number of rows that are linearly independent over Fq.
Proposition 1. Let M be a matrix fromMk,n (Fqm) and set s = |M | with s < n. There exist then
M∗ inMk,s (Fqm) with |M
∗| = s and T in GLn(Fq) such that:
MT = (M ∗ | 0) (2)
In particular for any x ∈ Fnqm such that |x| = s there exists T in GLn(Fq) for which xT = (x
∗ | 0)
where x∗ ∈ Fsqm and |x
∗| = s.
This permits to state the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For any M ∈Mk,n (Fqm) and for any m ∈ F
k
qm
|mM | 6 |M | (3)
Definition 3. For any x in Fqm and for any integer i, the quantity x
qi is denoted by x[i]. This notation
is extended to vectors x[i] = (x
[i]
1 , . . . , x
[i]
n ) and matrices M
[i] =
(
m
[i]
ij
)
.
We also give two lemmas that will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 3. For any A ∈ Mℓ,s (Fqm) and B ∈ Ms,n (Fqm), and for any α and β in Fq:
(αA+ βB)[i] = αA[i] + βB[i] and (AB)[i] = A[i]B[i].
In particular if S is in GLn(Fqm) then S
[i] also belongs to GLn(Fqm).
Lemma 4. Let P =
(
A 0
C D
)
where A and D are square matrices. Then P is non singular if and
only if A and D are non singular and the inverse of P is:
P−1 =
(
A−1 0
−D−1CA−1 D−1
)
1This rank is of course independent of the choice of the basis of Fqm since the rank of a matrix is invariant when
multiplied by an invertible matrix.
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Let us recall that a (linear) code of length n over a finite field F is a linear subspace of Fn. Elements
of a code are called codeword. A matrix whose rows form a basis of a code is called a generator
matrix. The dual of a code C ⊂ Fn is the linear space denoted by C⊥ containing vectors z ∈ Fn such
that:
∀c ∈ C ,
n∑
i=1
cizi = 0.
An algorithm D is said to decode t errors in a code C ⊂ Fn if for any c ∈ C and for any e ∈ Fn such
that |e| 6 t we have D(c + e) = c. Generally, we call such a vector e an error vector. We introduce
now an important family of codes known for having an efficient decoding algorithm.
Definition 4 (Gabidulin code). Let g ∈ Fnqm such that |g| = n. The (n, k)−Gabidulin code denoted
by Gk (g) is the code with a generator matrix G where:
G =


g
[0]
1 · · · g
[0]
n
...
...
g
[k−1]
1 · · · g
[k−1]
n

 . (4)
Gabidulin codes are known to possess a fast decoding algorithm that can decode errors of weight t
provided that t 6 ⌊12 (n − k)⌋. Furthermore the dual of a Gabidulin code Gk (g) is also a Gabidulin
code.
We end this section by an important well-known property about Gabidulin codes.
Proposition 5. Let Gk (g) be a Gabidulin code of length n with generator matrix G and T ∈
GLn(Fq). Then GT is a generator matrix of the Gabidulin code Gk (gT )
Proof. From Lemma 3, we have (gT )[i] = g[i]T .  
3. RANK METRIC ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
The concept of rank metric cryptography appeared in [GPT91] where the authors propose a public
key encryption scheme using codes in a rank metric framework. They adapted McEliece’s general
idea [McE78] developed for the Hamming metric to the rank metric context. The key tool in the
design is to focus on linear codes having a fast rank-metric decoding algorithm like Gabidulin codes.
In this section, we recall the general principle that underlies all the existing rank encryption metric
schemes.
During the key generation phase, the integers k, ℓ, n and m are chosen such that k < n 6 m and
0 6 ℓ≪ n. It then randomly picks g ∈ Fnqm with |g| = n and definesG ∈ Mk,n (Fqm) as in (4), that
is to sayG is a generator matrix of the Gabidulin code Gk (g). The error-correcting capacity of Gk (g)
is denoted by t
def
= ⌊12 (n−k)⌋. An important step in the key generation is the “hiding” phase whereG
undergoes a transformation to mask the algebraic structure of Gabidulin codes. This transformation
is actually a probabilistic algorithm that adds some randomness to its input. Originally, the authors
in [GPT91] proposed to use a distortion transformation D : Fk×nqm −→ F
k×n
qm that sends any G to
D(G) = S(G +X) where X is a random matrix from Fk×nqm with a prescribed rank tX and S is an
invertible matrix. The public key is then Gpub = D(G) with the parameter tpub = t− tX while the
private key is (S,G). The encryption algorithm takes as input a plaintext m ∈ Fkqm and generates
a random e ∈ Fnqm such that |e| 6 tpub in order to compute the ciphertext c = mGpub + e. In
the decryption step the decoding algorithm of the Gabidulin code Gk (g) is applied to the ciphertext.
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This word can be decoded since the underlying codeword is corrupted by the error vector mSX + e
whose rank weight is |mSX + e| 6 |mSX|+ |e| 6 t since by Corollary 2 we have |mSX| 6 tX .
However, Gibson proved [Gib95, Gib96] that the GPT encryption scheme [GPT91] is vulnerable to
a polynomial time key recovery attack. Consequently, Gabidulin and Ourivski proposed in [GO01] a
reparation by considering a more general hiding transformation combining a distortion matrixX and
a right column scrambler P . The hidden generator matrix is more precisely of the form:
D(G) = S (X1 | G+X2)P (5)
where X1 ∈ Mk,ℓ (Fqm), X2 ∈ Mk,n (Fqm) such that |X2| < t and P ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq). The
public generator matrix is again Gpub
def
= D(G) which constitutes the public key with the public
parameter tpub
def
= t − t2 where t2
def
= |X2|. The decryption computes P
−1 = (Q1 | Q2) where
Q1 ∈ M(n+ℓ),ℓ (Fq) andQ2 ∈ M(n+ℓ),n (Fq). The last n components of cP
−1 is the vectormSG+
mSX2 + eQ2 and since |eQ2| 6 |e| and |mSX2| 6 |X2|, it follows that |mSX2 + eQ2| 6 t.
Applying a fast decoding algorithm to the last n components of cP−1 allows the legitimate user to
get mS and easily m.
We now state our first result about Gabidulin and Ouriviski reparation which proves that we can
always consider X2 = 0.
Proposition 6. Let Gpub be as in (5) and assume that |X2| = t2. There exist P
∗ ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq),
X∗ ∈ Mk,(ℓ+t2) (Fqm) and a matrix G
∗ that generates an (n − t2)−Gabidulin code Gk (g
∗) such
that
Gpub = S (X
∗ | G∗)P ∗. (6)
Furthermore, the error correction capability t∗ of Gk (g
∗) is equal to t− 12t2, and hence t
∗ > tpub.
Proof. Since |X2| = t2 then by Proposition 1 there exist T 2 in GLn(Fq) and X
′
2 in Mk,t2 (Fqm)
such that X2T 2 = (X
′
2 | 0). So by letting T =
(
Iℓ 0
0 T 2
)
we then have:
Gpub = S (X1 | G+X2)P = S (X1 | GT 2 +X2T 2)T
−1P
= S
(
X1 | G
′ +X2T 2
)
Q
where G′ = GT 2 and Q = T
−1P . Note that G′ generates the (n, k)−Gabidulin code Gk (g
′) with
g′ = gT 2 = (g
′
1, . . . , g
′
n). Let us decompose G
′ as (G′1 | G
′
2) where G
′
1 ∈ Mk,t2 (Fqm) and
G′2 ∈ Mk,(n−t2) (Fqm) we then have:
G′ +X2T 2 =
(
G′1 +X
′
2 | G
′
2
)
By setting X = (X1 | G
′
1 +X
′
2) we get (6) and G
′
2 generates the (n − t2, k)−Gabidulin Gk (g
′
2)
where g′2 = (g
′
t2+1, . . . , g
′
n). The error-correction capability t
∗ of Gk (g
′
2) is given by t
∗ = 12(n −
t2 − k) = t−
1
2t2 which implies t
∗ > t− t2.  
The first important consequence of Proposition 6 is the possibility for a cryptanalyst who is able to
derive (S,G∗,P ∗) fromGpub so that (6) is satisfied to decipher any ciphertext c = mGpub+e with
|e| 6 tpub. Thus any successful structural attack on the description (6) leads to a successful attack on
(5) and conversely since (6) corresponds to the special case where X2 = 0. Therefore the security of
the scheme given [GO01] is equivalent to the one of a scheme where X2 = 0.
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4. DISTINGUISHING PROPERTIES OF GABIDULIN CODES
We recall important algebraic properties about Gabidulin codes. It will explain why many attacks
occur when the underlying code is a Gabidulin one. One key property is that Gabidulin codes can be
easily distinguished from random linear codes. This singular behavior has been presicely exploited
by Overbeck [Ove05b, Ove05a, Ove08] to mount attacks.
Definition 5. For any integer i > 0 let Λi : Mk,n (Fqm) −→Mik,n (Fqm) be the Fq-linear operator
that maps anyM fromMk,n (Fqm) to Λi(M) where by definition:
Λi(M)
def
=


M [0]
...
M [i]

 . (7)
For any code G generated by a matrix G we denote by Λi(G ) the code generated by Λi(G).
Proposition 7. Let g be in Fnqm with |g| = n with n 6 m. For any integers k and i such that k 6 n
and i 6 n− k − 1 we have:
Λi
(
Gk (g)
)
= Gk+i (g) . (8)
The importance of Λi becomes clear when one compares the dimension of the code spanned by
Λi(G) for a randomly drawn matrix G and the dimension obtained when G generates a Gabidulin
code.
Proposition 8. if A ⊂ Fnqm is a code generated by a random matrix from Mk,n (Fqm) then with a
high probability:
dimΛi(A ) = min
{
n, (i+ 1)k
}
(9)
In the case of a Gabidulin code, we get a different situation as explained by Proposition 7. Thus
there is property that is computable in polynomial time distinguishes a Gabidulin code from a random
one. This can be used in a cryptanalysis context. In fact, Overbeck [Ove08] has proven that, for a
public matrix Gp given by equation (5) with X2 = 0 (in particular all the entries of P belong to
Fq), it is possible (under certain conditions) to find in polynomial time an alternative decomposition
ofGp of the from S
∗ (X∗ | G∗)P ∗ using the operator Λi. This decomposition allows to decrypt any
ciphertext computed with Gp. The reader can refer to Appendix A for details concerning attack. The
key reason explaining its success is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let us consider ℓ, k and n be positive integers with ℓ < n and 1 6 k < n. Let G be
inMk,n (Fqm) as a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, and X be a randomly drawn matrix from
Mk,ℓ (Fqm). Denote A as the code defined by the generator matrix (X | G). Then for any integer
i > 0
k + i 6 dimΛi (A ) 6 k + i+ d (10)
where d = min
{
(i+ 1)k, ℓ
}
.
Note that by construction ℓ 6 n and in Overbeck’s attack, the integer i is equal to n− k− 1 so that
we have both d = ℓ and, with high probability, the upper bound in (10) is actually an equality, namely
dimΛn−k−1 (A ) = k + (n− k − 1) + d = n+ ℓ− 1.
This implies that the dimension of Λi (A )
⊥ is equal to 1. This fact is then harnessed in [Ove08] to
recover an equivalent Gabidulin code which enables to decrypt any ciphertext.
IMPROVED CRYPTANALYSIS OF RANK METRIC SCHEMES BASED ON GABIDULIN CODES 7
Proposition 10 ([Ove08]). Assume that the public key isGpub = S (X | G)P withX ∈Mk,ℓ (Fqm),
P ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq) andG generates an (n, k)−Gabdidulin code. If dimΛn−k−1 (A ) is equal to 1 then
it is possible to recover with O
(
(n+ ℓ)3
)
field operations alternative matrices X∗ ∈ Mk,ℓ (Fqm),
P ∗ ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq) and G
∗ which generate an (n, k)−Gabdidulin code such that
Gpub = S (X
∗ | G∗)P ∗
Overbeck’s attack uses crucially two important facts (see Appendix A for more details): the column
scrambler matrix P is defined on the based field Fq, and the codimension ofΛn−k−1 (A ) is 1. Several
works propose to resist to Overbeck’s attack either by taking special distortion matrix so that the
second property is not true as in [Loi10, RGH10], or by taking a column scrambler matrix defined
over the extension field Fqm as in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11]. In this paper, we solely concentrate on
the second approach. In [GRS16, HTMR16] new generic decoding algorithms are presented whereas
our approach is directed towards recovering the structure of a Gabidulin code. We will prove that all
the existing schemes [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11] can be broken simply with the techniques developed
in [Ove08].
5. GABIDULIN’S GENERAL REPARATION
In this section, we focus on the reparation given in [Gab08]. This paper is the first to consider a
column scrambler matrix defined over the extension field. We describe only the key generation and
decryption steps of the scheme since the encryption operation is not modified. To the best of our
knowledge, no structural attack has been mounted against this description. The author claimed that
Overbeck’s attack is not applicable. But in Proposition 11, we prove that it is still possible to find an
alternative private key using precisely Overbeck’s technique.
Key generation.
(1) Pick at random g from Fnqm such that |g| = n and letG be a generator matrix of the Gabidulin
code Gk (g).
(2) Pick at random X ∈ Mk,ℓ (Fqm), S in GLk(Fqm) and P in GLn+ℓ(Fqm) such that there
exist Q11 in Mℓ,ℓ (Fqm), Q21 in Mn,ℓ (Fqm), Q22 in Mn,n (Fq) and Q12 in Mℓ,n (Fqm)
with |Q12| = s < t so that
P−1 =
(
Q11 Q12
Q21 Q22
)
. (11)
The public key is (Gpub, tpub) with tpub = t− s and
Gpub = S (X | G)P . (12)
Decryption.We have cP−1 = mS (X | G) + eP−1. Suppose that e = (e1 | e2) where e1 ∈ F
ℓ
qm
and e2 ∈ F
n
qm . We have:
eP−1 = (e1Q11 + e2Q21 | e1Q12 + e2Q22) (13)
It is clear that |e1Q12 + e2Q22| 6 |e1Q12|+ |e2Q22| 6 s + t− s. So the plaintext m is recovered
by applying the decoding algorithm only to the last n components of cP−1.
We state our main result proving that Overbeck’s attack is still successful by considering this time
the dual of Λi (Gpub) with i = n− s− k − 1.
Proposition 11. There existX∗ ∈Mk,ℓ+s (Fqm), P
∗ ∈ GLn+ℓ (Fq) and a generator matrixG
∗ that
defines an (n− s, k)−Gabidulin code Gk (g
∗) such that
Gpub = S (X
∗ | G∗)P ∗. (14)
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Furthermore, the error correction capability t∗ of Gk (g
∗) is equal to t− 12s, and hence t
∗ > tpub.
The proof of this proposition requires to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 12. There exist P 11 in GLℓ+s(Fqm), P 21 in M(n−s),(ℓ+s) (Fqm) and P 22 in GLn−s(Fq)
such that
P =
(
Iℓ 0
0 L
)(
P 11 0
P 21 P 22
)(
Iℓ 0
0 R
)
(15)
with L and R belonging to GLn(Fq).
Proof. By assumption |Q12| = s < t so there exist R in GLn(Fq) and Q
′
12 inMℓ,s (Fqm) such that
Q12R = (Q
′
12 | 0). We setQ22R = (Q
′
22 | Q
′
23) whereQ
′
22 inMn,s (Fq) andQ
′
23 inMn,n−s (Fq).
Note that we necessarily have |Q′23| 6 n − s and therefore there exists L ∈ GLn(Fq) such that
LQ′23 =
(
0
Q′′23
)
withQ′′23 ∈ Mn−s,n−s (Fq). Thus one can rewrite
(
Iℓ 0
0 L
)
P−1
(
Iℓ 0
0 R
)
=
(
Iℓ 0
0 L
)(
Q11 Q12
Q21 Q22
)(
Iℓ 0
0 R
)
(16)
=
(
Q11 Q
′
12 0
LQ21 LQ
′
22 LQ
′
23
)
(17)
Observe that there exist Q′′11 inMℓ+s,ℓ+s (Fqm) and Q
′′
21 inMn−s,ℓ+s (Fqm) so that we can write(
Iℓ 0
0 L
)
P−1
(
Iℓ 0
0 R
)
=
(
Q′′11 0
Q′′21 Q
′′
23
)
.
Note thatQ′′23 andQ
′′
11 are necessarily invertible and thanks to Lemma 4 the proof can be terminated.
 
Remark 2. The proof of Lemma 12 is still true if it is assumed that |Q12| < s, and note that by
construction s is necessarily less than or equal to ℓ.
We are now able to give a proof of Proposition 11.
Proposition 11. We keep the same notation as those of Lemma 12. Let us rewrite GL as (G′1 | G
′
2)
where G′1 in Mk,s (Fqm) and G
′
2 in Mk,n−s (Fqm) and set now Y = (X | G
′
1). Observe that G
′
2
generates an (n− s, k)−Gabidulin code. We then have
(X | G)
(
Iℓ 0
0 L
)(
P 11 0
P 21 P 22
)
=
(
Y | G′2
)(P 11 0
P 21 P 22
)
= (X∗ | G∗)
where X∗ = Y P 11 +G
′
2P 21 and G
∗ = G′2P 22 is a generator matrix of an (n − s, k)−Gabidulin
code. Hence if we set P ∗ =
(
Iℓ 0
0 R
)
we then have rewritten Gpub as expected in (14). Lastly
remark that tpub = t− s and t
∗ = 12(n− s− k) =
1
2(n− k)−
1
2s > t− s.  
6. GABIDULIN, RASHWAN AND HONARY VARIANT
In [GRH09, RGH11] Gabidulin, Rashwan and Honary proposed an other variant where the column
scrambler has its entries defined on the extension field. We will prove that their scheme is actually
a special case of [Gab08] and because of that, it suffers the same weakness. So, unlike what it is
claimed by the authors, Overbeck’s attack is still successful.
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Key generation.
(1) Pick at random g ∈ Fnqm such that |g| = n and let G ∈ Mk,n (Fqm) be a generator matrix of
the Gabidulin code Gk (g). Let tpub be an integer < t and set a
def
= t− tpub.
(2) Pick at random S in GLk(Fqm) and P ∈ GLn(Fqm) such that
P−1 = (Q1 | Q2) (18)
where Q1 ∈ Mn,a (Fqm) while Q2 ∈ Mn,n−a (Fq) with t =
1
2 (n − k) and tpub < t. The
public key is (Gpub, tpub) with
Gpub = SGP . (19)
Decryption. First, we have cP−1 = mSG + eP−1 and eP−1 = (eQ1 | eQ2). Observe that
|eQ1| 6 a and |eQ2| 6 |e| 6 tpub, and since a = t− tpub we hence have∣∣eP−1∣∣ 6 |eQ1|+ |eQ2| 6 t.
We now prove that Overbeck’s attack is still successful by considering for this scheme the dual
of Λi (Gpub) with i = n − a − k − 1. We first introduce the matrices Q11 ∈ Ma,a (Fqm), Q21 ∈
Mn−a,a (Fqm),Q12 ∈ Ma,n−a (Fq) and Q22 ∈ Mn−a,n−a (Fq) such that
P−1 =
(
Q11 Q12
Q21 Q22
)
. (20)
Note that |Q12| 6 a < t. Furthermore, by looking at the proof of Lemma 12, we can see that this
lemma and Proposition 11 are still true even if |Q12| 6 s. Hence, the scheme given in [GRH09,
RGH11] is nothing else but a special case of [Gab08] where X = 0 and Q12 has all its entries in the
base field Fq. We have therefore the following corollary.
Corollary 13. There exist P ∗ ∈ GLn(Fq) and X ∈Mk,a (Fqm) such that
Gpub = S(X | G
∗)P ∗ (21)
where G∗ is a generator matrix of an (n − a, k)−Gabidulin code whose error correction capability
t∗ is equal to ⌊12(t+ tpub)⌋, and hence t
∗ > tpub.
Proof. Apply Proposition 11 with ℓ = 0 and s = a. Note that the error correction capability t∗ of the
code G∗ is equal to 12(n− a− k) that is to say
t∗ = t−
1
2
(t− tpub) =
1
2
(t+ tpub) > tpub.
 
We summarised in Table 1 our experimental results obtained with Magma V2.21-6. We give the
time to find an alternative column scrambler matrix for each parameter proposed by the authors in
[GRH09] and [RGH11]. In particular, our results outperform those given in [GRS16, HTMR16].
7. DISCUSSION ON A MORE GENERAL COLUMN SCRAMBLER
In [GRH09] the authors proposed to reinforce the security by taking a more general column scram-
bler matrix of the form TP where T is an invertible matrix with its entries in Fq and P is defined
over the extension field as it is done in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH10]. We shall consider Gabidulin’s
general reparation [Gab08] since [GRH09, RGH10] are particular cases but we emphasize that this
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m k t tpub Time (second)
20 10 5 4 6 1
28 14 7 3 6 1
28 14 7 4 6 1
28 14 7 5 6 1
28 14 7 6 6 1
20 10 5 4 6 1
TABLE 1. Parameters from [GRH09, RGH11] where n = m and at least 80-bit security.
new protection was only defined in [GRH09, RGH10]. Assuming that P is then as in (11), the public
key is then of the form
Gpub = S (X | G)TP . (22)
The decryption of a ciphertext c starts by calculating cP−1T−1 = mS (X | G)+ eP−1T−1 where
e is of rank weight tpub and s = |Q12|. The retrieving of the original plaintextm is possible provided
that tpub = t− ℓ− s because cP
−1T−1 = mS (X | G) + eP−1T−1. Suppose that e = (e1 | e2)
where e1 ∈ F
ℓ
qm and e2 ∈ F
n
qm , then we also have
eP−1T−1 = (e1Q11 + e2Q21 | e1Q12 + e2Q22)T
−1. (23)
It is clear that |e1Q12 + e2Q22| 6 |e1Q12|+ |e2Q22| 6 s+ tpub and hence it implies that∣∣eP−1T−1∣∣ = ∣∣eP−1∣∣ 6 |e1Q11 + e2Q21|+ |e1Q12 + e2Q22| 6 ℓ+ s+ tpub.
Therefore the plaintext m is recovered by applying the decoding algorithm only to the last n compo-
nents of cP−1T−1. But in this case, the rank weight of the last n components of eP−1T−1 is not
necessarily less than or equal to tpub + s but rather to tpub + s+ ℓ. Consequently, the decryption will
always succeed if it assumed that tpub = t − s − ℓ otherwise the decoding may fail. Hence, we see
why this new reparation was just proposed for the case where ℓ = 0 i.e. without any distorsion matrix
since otherwise its deteriorates the performances of the original scheme.
We now study more precisely the security this protection might bring in for the general scheme of
[Gab08]. First, rewrite T as
T =
(
T 11 T 12
T 21 T 22
)
(24)
where T 11 ∈ Mℓ,ℓ (Fq), T 21 ∈ Mn,ℓ (Fq), T 12 ∈ Mℓ,n (Fq) and T 22 ∈ Mn,n (Fq). On the other
hand, by Lemma 12 the matrix P can be expressed as (15). We can find then X1 inMk,(ℓ+s) (Fqm)
and X2 inMk,(n−s) (Fqm) such that
(X | G)TP = (X1 |X2 +G
∗
1)
where G∗1 generates an (n − s, k)−Gabidulin code and |X2| = |X| 6 ℓ. From Proposition 6 and
by taking t2 = ℓ, there exist P
∗ ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq), X
∗ ∈ Mk,(2ℓ+s) (Fqm) and G
∗ that generates an
(n− s− ℓ)−Gabidulin code such that
(X | G)TP = (X∗ | G∗)P ∗. (25)
We have therefore proven the following proposition.
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Proposition 14. Assume that Gpub = S (X | G)TP where T ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq) and P has the form
(11). There exist then P ∗ in GLn+ℓ(Fq), X
∗ inMk,(2ℓ+s) (Fqm) and a matrix G
∗ that generates an
(n− s− ℓ, k)−Gabidulin code Gk (g
∗) such that
Gpub = S(X
∗ | G∗)P ∗.
Furthermore, the correction capability t∗ of Gk (g
∗) is greater than t − 12(ℓ + s). In particular
t∗ > tpub.
This result shows that actually this new proposed protection does not improve the security even
when applied with the scheme for which a distortion matrix X is used. An example where this
protection was used and turns out to be useless is the scheme given in [GRH09, RGH10].
8. CONCLUSION
The apparition of Overbeck’s attack prompted some authors to invent reparations to hide more
the structure of the Gabidulin codes. One trend advocated the use of a right column scrambler with
entries in the extension field as it is done in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11]. Our analysis shows that these
reparations aiming at resisting Overbeck’s structural attack do fail precisely against it. By applying
appropriately Overbeck’s technique, we were able to construct a Gabidulin code that has the same
dimension as the original one but with a lower length. Hence, we obtain a degraded Gabidulin code
in terms of error correction capabilities but we prove that the degradation does not forbid the error
correction of any ciphertext. Furthermore, when the attack is implemented, the practical results we
obtained outperform those given in [GRS16, HTMR16] which were up to our paper the best attacks
against the schemes of [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11]. We also considered in Section 7 the case where an
isometric transformation is applied in conjunction with a right column scrambler which has its entries
in the extension field. We proved that this protection is useless both in terms of performance and
security.
The other kind of reparation is followed by the series of works in [Loi10, RGH10] which propose
to resist to Overbeck’s attack by taking a distortion matrixX so that the codimension of Λn−k−1 (A )
is equal to a where a is sufficiently large to prevent an exhaustive search. But these reparations were
cryptanalyzed in [GRS16, HMR15].
Furthermore, since the attack in [HMR15] only considers column scrambler matrices on the base
field, one may try to avoid it by combining the reparations proposed in [Loi10, RGH10] with those
of [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11]. Nevertheless, our paper shows that the security of [Gab08, GRH09,
RGH11] can be reduced to the one with a column scrambler with entries in the base field. Conse-
quently, using our results and then applying the general attack of [HMR15] may break this “patched”
scheme.
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APPENDIX A. OVERBECK’S ATTACK
Let assume that Gpub = S (X | G)P is the public generator matrixthat generates Cpub with
P ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq), X ∈ Mk,ℓ (Fqm) and G generates a Gabidulin code Gk (g) where |g| = n.
Observe that Λi(Gpub) can be written as
Λi (Gpub) = Sext
(
Λi (X) | Λi (G)
)
P where Sext
def
=


S[0] 0
. . .
0 S[i]

 . (26)
Since Λi (G) generates Gk+i (g) = Gn−1 (g), there exists S
′ ∈ GLk(i+1)i(Fqm) such that
S′Λi (Gpub) =
(
X∗ Gn−1
X∗∗ 0
)
P (27)
where X∗ ∈ M(n−1),ℓ (Fqm), X
∗∗ ∈ M(k(i+1)−n+1),ℓ (Fqm) and Gn−1 ∈ M(n−1),n (Fqm) gener-
ates Gn−1 (g). Using (27), one can deduce that by taking i = n− k − 1
dimΛn−k−1(Cpub) = n− 1 + rank(X
∗∗).
In the particular case where rank(X∗∗) = ℓ then dimΛi(Cpub) = n+ℓ−1 and thus dimΛi(Cpub)
⊥ =
1. Furthermore, if h is a non zero vector from Gn−1 (g)
⊥
and we set h∗ = (0 | h)
(
P−1
)T
then under
the assumption that rank(X∗∗) = ℓ we have
Λn−k−1(Cpub)
⊥ = Fqmh
∗. (28)
Proposition 15. Let v ∈ Λn−k−1(Cpub)
⊥ with v 6= 0. Any matrix T ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq) that satisfies
vT =
(
0 | h′
)
with h′ ∈ Fnqm is an alternative column scrambler matrix, that is to say, there exist Z
inMk,ℓ (Fqm) and G
∗ that generates a Gabidulin code Gk (g
∗) such that
Gpub = S (Z | G
∗)T .
Proof. From (28) there exists α ∈ Fqm such that v = αh
∗ = (0 | αh)
(
P−1
)T
where h is a non
zero vector of Gn−1 (g)
⊥
. Let T ∈ GLn+ℓ(Fq) such that vT
T = (0 | h′) and consider the matrices
A ∈ Mℓ,ℓ (Fq) and D ∈ Mn,n (Fq) so that
TP−1 =
(
A B
C D
)
.
We have then the following equalities
h˜T T = (0 | αh)
(
P−1
)T
T T = (0 | αh)
(
TP−1
)T
= (0 | h′) (29)
It comes out from (29) that hBT = 0 and hence B = 0 since |h| = n. So we can write TP−1 =(
A 0
C D
)
and using Lemma 4, PT−1 =
(
A′ 0
C ′ D′
)
. Consequently,
GpubT
−1 = S (X | G)
(
A′ 0
C ′ D′
)
= S (Z | G∗)
where G∗ = GD′ is a generator matrix of an (n, k)−Gabidulin code. So T is an alternative column
scrambler matrix for the system. 
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